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Abstract
In July 2001, Lieutenant General Donald L. Peterson, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Personnel, United States Air Force, testified before Congress that adverse retention rates
were senior leadership’s number one concern. Military compensation sustains “defense
manpower policies that in turn support the nation’s defense strategy.” Defense spending
must be allocated efficiently to maintain the optimal mix of forces and weapon systems to
respond to national security objectives. The President requested $149.9 billion for
military pay and healthcare for Fiscal Year 2009, or 29 percent of the total proposed
defense budget. When military compensation constitutes nearly one-third of department
expenses, its impact on retention of personnel must meet targets.
This thesis estimates the value of military compensation’s effect on the probability
of retaining Air Force personnel in a cross-sectional analysis. The findings suggest that
compensation packages are effective at retaining military members at critical points in
their career to develop senior officer and enlisted leaders. Prior research estimated at the
aggregate level, but we modeled our data for individual observations to estimate how
members prefer to delay civilian earnings until after retirement eligibility. We found that
our findings, while interesting, would improve if estimated through a binary probit model
in time-series analysis.
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AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF COMPENSATION TO RETENTION
I. Introduction

Purpose
This thesis estimates the value of military compensation’s effect on the probability
of retaining Air Force personnel in a cross-sectional analysis. The findings suggest that
compensation packages are effective at retaining military members at critical points in
their career to develop senior officer and enlisted leaders. Prior research estimated at the
aggregate level, but we modeled our data for individual observations to estimate how
members prefer to delay civilian earnings until after retirement eligibility. We found that
our findings, while interesting, would improve if estimated through a binary probit model
in time-series analysis.
Background
In July 2001, Lieutenant General Donald L. Peterson, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Personnel, United States Air Force, testified before Congress that adverse retention rates
were senior leadership’s number one concern. He went on to say, “We need to attract
America’s best and brightest, and we must retain them. While patriotism is the number
one reason our people – both officers and enlisted – stay in the Air Force, patriotism
alone cannot be the sole motivation for a military career” (Peterson, 2001:4). “While
intangible factors like patriotism are important draws for many who volunteer to serve,
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the military relies heavily on good pay and benefits—the tangible rewards for service—to
maintain its competitive edge as an employer in U.S. labor markets” (Williams, 2005:11).
Defense spending must be allocated efficiently to maintain the optimal mix of
forces and weapon systems to respond to national security objectives. Compensation to
military members of the US armed services is the third largest element of the Department
of Defense (DoD) budget, behind Strategic Modernization and Operations, Readiness and
Support. The President requested $149.9 billion for military pay and healthcare in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2009, or 29 percent of the total proposed budget (DoD, 2008a:6). Historically
comparing, the President requested 25 percent more for military compensation than in the
previous fiscal year (DoD, 2008a:8).
The nation’s military remains engaged in combat, costly both in lives and federal
spending, since the 9/11 attacks. From 2001 through the end of FY 2007, Congress spent
$602 billion in military operations and related activities in the Global War on Terror
(Orszag, 2007:3). As of 18 December 2008, 4,824 military members lost their lives in
the wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan (OSD, 2008). As the complexity of the war
grows, military members are challenged with responsibilities in hostile environments that
may shape their decision criteria for separating from the service (Burrell, 2007:24).
Competitive wages from the private industry may have adverse effects on retention rates
of high-quality military members when similar or higher salaries are available without the
dangers and instability of war. Military compensation supports “defense manpower
policies that in turn support the nation’s defense strategy” (DoD, 2008b:33). When
military compensation constitutes nearly a third of the entire defense budget, its influence
on retention of uniformed personnel must meet targets.
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Research Question
How does the marginal effect of cash and non-cash military compensation
influence the decision of US Air Force personnel to continue active duty service to
retirement eligibility?
Scope
The Sixth Edition of the Military Compensation Background Papers published by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) identified six principles to guide the
discussion on the military personnel compensation system. OSD defined these
principles: (1) Manpower/Compensation Interrelationship, (2) Compatibility with
Technology and Tactics, (3) Equity, (4) Effectiveness in Peace and War, (5) Flexibility,
and (6) Motivational Aspects (OSD, 2005:4).
The first principle recognizes the role of compensation in maintaining the optimal
mix of forces in the armed services given their objectives. Compensation must be
adequate enough to support manpower policies designed to sustain the military strategies
in defense of this nation.
Secondly, compensation must maintain the personnel base, both in rank and skillset, to meet the manning needs of these weapon systems in the future (OSD, 2005:5). If
compensation fails to recruit and retain high quality personnel, the personnel budget will
ineffectively crowd-out recapitalization and modernization of weapon systems.
Next, the two basic tenets of equity deal largely with the concept of fairness.
Military members, just as any member of the labor force, desire to be compensated fairly;
compensation should be comparable and competitive.
Additionally, military compensation must demonstrate effectiveness in the
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recruiting and retention of high-quality military personnel in times of war just as in times
of peace. DoD only has one compensation system regardless if the armed services are
engaged in a military contingency or not, however severe the conflict may be. The
department, however, does make minor adjustments to the compensation system to offer
monetary benefits when a service member is deployed in support of a military
contingency.
Furthermore, military compensation must be flexible to accommodate changes in
military objectives and the dynamics of the private sector. Military compensation must
be flexible to respond to manpower policies and changes in civilian wages for various
sectors.
Lastly, the compensation system must recognize the relationship with pay and
effort. The military force structure promotes officers and enlisted members to encourage
performance and desire for more responsibility (OSD, 2005:9).
Approach/Methodology
We engaged our research question with a review of previous literature, data
collection, and regression analysis to estimate the relationship between military
compensation and the retention of uniformed personnel in the US Air Force. We
collected data to develop a binomial response variable to quantitatively describe the
continuation decision of military members. In our research, we reviewed a series of
inputs that we believe have a relationship with the decision military members make
regarding retention and collected data to represent these variables. Additionally, we
controlled for differences in groups through the use of dummy variables for gender, rank,
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Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), commissioning source for officers, and citizenship
status for enlisted members.
We modeled our data at three points available in our sampling frame: the stay-orgo decision from 2001 to 2002, 2004 to 2005, and 2007 to 2008. We estimated officers
and enlisted personnel separately through a probit model for binary response. Each
model estimated the significant contributing factors in an individual’s decision to remain
in the service from year n to year n + 1.
Significance
Researchers often conduct regression analysis using continuous values to describe
the dependent variable. Observing the dependent variable on this scale allows it to take
on predicted values without restriction. The predicted value of the dependent variable
may be expressed as an integer, as a decimal point, and even a negative number when
regressed on the explanatory variables. While useful in other conditions, conventional
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis does not reveal the interesting relationship we are
concerned with in this thesis because its use constitutes a misspecification.
We modeled the relationship of variables that influence the decision to either
remain in active duty service (stay) or pursue employment elsewhere (go). We define
this decision as the dependent variable “Continue.” The explained variable does not take
on continuous values; it is either “Stay” or “Go,” or binary in nature. Therefore, we
model our independent variables to observe what factors are statistically significant in the
individual decision analysis to continue on active duty service in the Air Force from year
n to year n + 1.
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Previous research modeled this relationship at the aggregate level. Burrell (2007)
used continuation rates to proxy for retention. Continuation rates represent the
percentage of Air personnel that continue in active duty service from one year to the next.
Burrell’s methodology observed how Air Force-level retention changes when factors
such as military retirement, unemployment rates, and annual pay raises change. We
model our data at the individual level. Researchers may use binary variables to describe
a qualitative event; such as dummy variables in the explanatory variables to allow for an
intercept change and/or a slope change amongst various groups. Instead, we use a binary
variable to describe a qualitative event: will an individual stay in the Air Force (y = 1) or
go (y = 0) with a given value of xn?
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II. Literature Review

Overview
In July 2001, Lieutenant General Donald L. Peterson, Deputy Chief of Staff,
Personnel, United States Air Force, testified before Congress that adverse retention rates
were senior leadership’s number one concern. He went on to say, “We need to attract
America’s best and brightest, and we must retain them. While patriotism is the number
one reason our people – both officers and enlisted – stay in the Air Force, patriotism
alone cannot be the sole motivation for a military career” (Peterson, 2001:4). “While
intangible factors like patriotism are important draws for many who volunteer to serve,
the military relies heavily on good pay and benefits—the tangible rewards for service—to
maintain its competitive edge as an employer in U.S. labor markets” (Williams, 2005:11).
Military Compensation Context
The Sixth Edition of the Military Compensation Background Papers published by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) identified six principles to guide the
discussion on the military personnel compensation system. OSD defined these
principles: (1) Manpower/Compensation Interrelationship, (2) Compatibility with
Technology and Tactics, (3) Equity, (4) Effectiveness in Peace and War, (5) Flexibility,
and (6) Motivational Aspects (OSD, 2005:4).
Manpower/Compensation Interrelationship
The first principle recognizes the role of compensation in maintaining the optimal
mix of forces in the armed services given their objectives. Compensation must be
adequate enough to support manpower policies designed to sustain the military strategies
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in defense of this nation. Force shaping problems, an imbalance of officers and enlisted
personnel or among specialties and skills, will likely ensue when compensation does not
adequately meet service member expectations. Lieutenant General Roger A. Brady,
former deputy chief of staff for manpower and personnel, stated, “If we get too far out of
balance, we cannot operate as effectively. We cannot recapitalize, we cannot replace the
old equipment that we have. And the Airmen who remain with us do not get the training
they need or the equipment they need, and we have hard time sustaining operations”
(Gettle, 2006a). Those results will frustrate national security strategy and, in turn, negate
defense policy objectives (OSD, 2005:4).
Compatibility with Technology and Tactics
The emergence of costly technologies on the battlefield to support military tactics
heightens the level of scrutiny on military compensation. Firstly, compensation places a
tremendous fiscal burden on the Defense budget; the costs must not encumber on the
procurement for new weapon system requirements. In recent years, the Air Force’s
efforts to recapitalize and modernize aging weapon systems led to a reshaping of force
structure. The Air Force targeted 20,000 reductions in military personnel between fiscal
years 2005 and 2007; this included 8,000 personnel cuts in the officer corps in 2007 alone
(Gettle, 2006a,b). The military reductions coincided with the most fleet modernization
funding requested in 15 years as the Air Force made large investments in C-17
Globemasters, F-22A Raptors, and unmanned aerial vehicles (Munoz, 2006).
Compensation must maintain the personnel base, both in rank and skill-set, to meet the
manning needs of these weapon systems in the future (OSD, 2005:5). If compensation
fails to recruit and retain high quality personnel, the personnel budget will ineffectively
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crowd-out recapitalization and modernization of weapon systems.
Equity
The two basic tenets of equity deal largely with the concept of fairness. Military
members, just as any member of the labor force, desire to be compensated fairly;
compensation should be comparable and competitive. Comparable refers to uniformed
personnel being paid what one would expect in the private sector. DoD programs
compensation based on civilian positions with similar responsibilities and possessing
similar experience and education levels. The concept of competitiveness relates how
well military compensation compares to private sector salaries. In order to compete for
high-quality uniformed personnel, members must prefer military compensation to private
industry compensation (OSD, 2005:5). The degree to which military members prefer
military compensation measures how well competitive pay and benefits met the military
members’ expectations. We expect military members to value the comparability and
competiveness of military compensation differently based on the years of service because
the value of deferred benefits become more valuable as a military member gets closer to
retirement eligibility.
Effectiveness in Peace and War
Military compensation must demonstrate effectiveness in the recruiting and
retention of high-quality military personnel in times of war just as in times of peace.
DoD only has one compensation system regardless if the armed services are engaged in a
military contingency or not, however severe the conflict may be. The department,
however, does make minor adjustments to the compensation system to offer monetary
benefits when a service member is deployed in support of a military contingency. The
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benefits include, but are not limited to, exclusion from federal income tax, family
separation allowance, and hardship duty pay for the months that a member serves in a
deployed location. OSD designs the compensation system to allow normal flow of
personnel to complement barriers to entry and exit of the service, in the recruiting of
high-quality personnel and separation or retirement of military members, respectively.
The effectiveness of the compensation system in sustaining the best mix of forces allows
mission success during peacetime training and wartime execution (OSD, 2005:7).
Flexibility
Despite the use of only one compensation system, military compensation must be
flexible to accommodate changes in military objectives and the dynamics of the private
sector. Compensation must be economically efficient, as General Peterson said, in
keeping “…the right number of people. Not too few. Not too many” (Gettle, 2006a). He
added, “I think there are a lot of things we find, when you have a large organization like
the Air Force, that are inefficiencies we can cut out. We are going to be more efficient
than we have been forced to in the past.” Changes in the national economy and the
supply and demand of high-quality personnel motivate rapid adjustments in
compensation (OSD, 2005:8). For example, wage increases in private industry have
changed across time; however, compensation within and across white- and blue-collar
industries has not followed the same pattern (Schwenk, 1997:14). Differences in skill,
education, and ability help explain how the range of salaries has grown since the early
1980’s (Asch, 2002:2). To accommodate such dynamics, the Air Force offers special
pays to retain specialty skills. For that reason, competitive bonuses are offered for
professionals in the aviation, legal, and medical fields to retain against changes in civilian

10

wages for the same sectors.
Motivational Aspects
Lastly, the compensation system must recognize the relationship with pay and
effort. The military force structure promotes officers and enlisted members to encourage
performance and desire for more responsibility (OSD, 2005:9). “A promotion is not a
reward for past service; it is an advancement to a higher grade based on future potential
as demonstrated by past performance” (AFI 36-201, 2007:62). Duty positions are
designed to commensurate with the level of responsibility for the appropriate rank. The
Air Force awards promotions based on relative rather than absolute performance. Greater
potential may be associated aptly with smarter or more capable personnel since these
individuals are more likely to achieve a higher rank-order. However, less able military
personnel can overcome the disadvantage by exerting more effort. Therefore, the
compensation system should motivate personnel to perform at or even beyond their
potential as measured by intelligence (Asch, 1994:54).

Assessment of Military Compensation
Active duty military personnel earn compensation commensurate with rank, years
of service, and dependency status. 10 U.S.C. §101(d)(1) defines active duty personnel as
those members on full-time duty in the active service to include full-time training, annual
training duty, and attendance, while in the active military service, at a school designated
as a service school by law, or the Service concerned. DoD does not consider full-time
National Guard duty as active-duty despite the similarities. The department, since the
Gorham Commission in 1962, assesses active-duty personnel pay relative to private
industry wages through the use of Regular Military Compensation (RMC) (OSD,
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2005:14). Four elements comprise RMC that military members receive either directly or
indirectly, in cash or in kind: basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for
subsistence, and tax advantage.
Grade and years-of-service determine the first component, basic pay. Most often,
rank and grade are parallel. For example, a Captain earns O-3 pay and a Master Sergeant
earns E-7 pay. When a member fills a duty position that requires an individual with a
higher rank, the member can be frocked. In that event, the member wears a higher rank,
but continues to be paid according to their current grade. The Defense Finance and
Accounting Service (DFAS) publishes basic pay rates annually; the rates include pay
raises as years-of-service and grade increase. Secondly, military members earn Basic
Allowance for Housing (BAH), a non-taxable housing allowance based on rank and
dependency status and adjusted for duty location, to defer housing costs at the members’
duty location. The Per Diem, Travel, and Transportation established BAH rates to
prevent military members from incurring out-of-pocket expenses beyond the entitlement
for a rental property. The expected square footage for a member at a particular grade and
dependency status determines the dollar value of the entitlement. Next, Basic Allowance
for Subsistence (BAS), a non-taxable allowance as well, serves to defray the cost of food
for military members; the amount is based on whether the member is an officer or an
enlisted Airman. BAS, unlike the other entitlements, pays a lower rate to officers than to
enlisted members. Lastly, federal income tax advantage rounds out the four elements of
RMC. Since BAS and BAS are not taxed as income, OSD quantifies the tax advantage as
the dollar value that a member would pay in federal income tax if they were taxed.
(DoD, 2008b:20)
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History
History shows that since the beginning of the all-volunteer force, retention suffers
when RMC falls with respect to civilian wages. Military officials attribute this pay gap to
the recruiting problem that beset the military services in the late 1970’s. The DoD
Authorization Act of 1981 included an 11.7 percent pay increase to mitigate the
recruiting and retention shortfalls when RMC was set to civilian wages for workers with
comparable education and experience levels (OSD, 2005:34). Many pay comparisons
begin in 1982 since Congress instituted large raises to mitigate perceived pay gaps
between military personnel and workers in the private sector (CBO, 2007:2).
The Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) is an investigative
look at compensation charged to the Secretary of Defense by the President. In his charge
to the Secretary for the 10th QRMC, President George W. Bush stated in August 2005:
To continue to recruit and retain highly qualified personnel for the uniformed
services as they transform themselves to meet new challenges, the departments
concerned must offer, in addition to challenging and rewarding duties,
compensation appropriate to the services rendered to the Nation. The departments
also must apply the substantial taxpayer resources devoted to uniformed services
compensation in the most effective manner possible (DoD, 2008b:ix).

For more than 30 years, the DoD successfully recruited and retained personnel in
the correct size and skill-set to support the Department’s strategy objectives. The DoD
recruited 180,000 new active duty enlisted members in fiscal year 2007; not one branch
of service failed to meet its recruiting goals. This number may suggest that there is not a
recruiting problem, however there are more details worthy of note.
The DoD evaluates the quality of enlisted recruits through the use of two measures
called educational achievement and training aptitude. Educational achievement is the
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percentage of recruits who successfully complete high school. The DoD uses the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) as the training aptitude measure.
Recruits with high school diplomas and scores at the 50th percentile or higher
generally complete their first term of enlistment and perform better on the job than those
with General Educational Development certificates and scores below the 50th percentile.
The DoD sets the educational achievement standard at 90 percent of recruits completing
high school. The training aptitude benchmark is 60 percent scoring at or above the 50th
percentile, or Category I-IIIA.

Figure 1. Recruit Quality for the Active Duty Enlisted Force, 1973-2007
Source: (DoD, 2008b:4)
Figure 1 suggests that while raw numbers are being met for the size of recruiting classes
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in the DoD, the proportion of accessions that the Department targets as high-quality
recruits has fallen consistently in the past fifteen years aside from an increase following
the boost in patriotism in the United States following the 9/11 attacks.
Figure 2 aggregates the two measures of recruit quality but separates the success of
recruiting between the branches of service. The reader should note that the proportion of
high quality recruits decreased as the number of authorizations in the DoD were drawn
down throughout the 1990’s. This left fewer high-quality uniformed personnel to fill the
senior ranks in subsequent years and may leave a void in the capabilities of tomorrow’s
force.

Figure 2: High-Quality Recruits to the Active Duty Enlisted Force, 1973-2007
Source: (DoD, 2008b:5)
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In Figure 2, we observe a downward trend in recent years. After a brief increase in the
quantity of high-quality recruits in 2000, we see a downward trend re-emerge in 2004.
Drops in the proportion of high quality recruits can be attributed to a few external factors:
more students entering two- and four-year colleges and universities, increase in family
income to pay for students entering higher learning institutions, a growing economy, and
less influencers recommending the military.
How do these recruiting talking points affect retention? The decreasing number of
high-quality recruits leaves a smaller pool of talent to fill senior ranks. The 9th QRMC
recommended that military pay be comparable to the 70th percentile of civilian wages of
similar education and experience. In previous years, the DoD used high school graduates
as the appropriate demographic to program salaries of enlisted personnel and college
graduates for officers. The 2002 analysis found that education levels of the mid- and
senior-level enlisted ranks and junior officers have increased significantly in recent years.
A 2005 study estimated that 72 percent of enlisted members had one or more years of
college education. (CBO, 2007:12). Therefore, the 9th QRMC found RMC to be below
the 70th percentile of these groups when compared to the targeted civilian populations.
The 2002 National Defense Authorization Act included a pay increase to retain and draw
down the pay gap between mid- and senior level non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and
junior officers with civilian wages. We observed, as a result, more favorable comparison
between military and civilian wages. For example, in 2006 the average enlisted member
earned approximately $5,400 more than civilian counterparts; the average officer earned
$6,000 more. The following figures compare RMC to the 70th percentile for enlisted and
officer personnel, respectively, in 2006. The graphic confirms a 2005 analysis that

16

suggested RMC is comparable to the selected benchmark. (CBO, 2007:2).

Figure 3: Enlisted Regular Military Compensation versus Civilian Earnings, 2006
Source: (DoD, 2008b:25).

Figure 4: Officer Regular Military Compensation versus Civilian Earnings, 2006
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Source: (DoD, 2008b:25).
Although interesting for a quick, aggregate review of the average military member,
the decision criteria of military members is anything but average. For example, the top
50 percent of officers work in thirteen of a possible 141 fields. How do those officers
compare to wage earners in the civilian population? Does the civilian population have 50
percent of its work force working as mobility pilots, fighter pilots, clinical nurses, air
battle managers, development engineers, students, or employed in communications and
information, space and missile, intelligence, personnel, and logistics readiness? While
the answer to that question is outside of the scope of research for our paper, we introduce
the idea because we believe that military members are too complex to model at the
aggregate level. The military member perceives skill transferability, education benefits,
the economy, and the value of cash and non-cash compensation differently and should be
modeled at the individual level.

Types of Compensation
Cash compensation, or RMC, composes 48 percent of total compensation to
uniformed personnel and is usually the source of basis between comparable wages
between military members and private industry. There are four elements that make up
RMC: basic pay, BAH, BAS, and the tax advantage incurred because BAH and BAS are
not taxed as income.
Basic pay, the largest part of RMC at approximately 58 percent, is paid to all
uniformed personnel based on rank and years of service except during periods of
unauthorized absence, excess leave, or confinement after an enlistment has expired. It is
annually adjusted to reflect increases in civilian sector wages and inflation. Civilian
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sector wages are estimated using the Economic Cost Index (ECI) found in the Labor
Statistics published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. By law, the annual increase in
basic pay should be equal to ECI, but Congress approves increases in the National
Defense Appropriations Act above and beyond ECI when military compensation levels
are an area of concern.
Military members residing in civilian quarters are paid BAH, a tax-exempt housing
allowance. The DoD reviews and annually adjusts BAH as the amount needed to rent
adequate housing at military members’ duty location. (OSD, 2005:19). Military
members can anticipate adequate housing to be the square footage needed based on
expected family size at particular ranks. The dollar value of the entitlement varies
according to rental costs at the member’s duty location and a higher rate is paid to
personnel with dependents; on average, BAH comprises nearly 18 percent of cash
compensation. On average, single members receive 23 percent less BAH than their
cohorts with dependents.
Military members are paid BAS, a tax-free payment, to be partly defray the cost of
feeding the member; there are no provisions for military dependents. The annual
adjustment for BAS is uniquely tied to the change in the price of food, not wages (OSD,
2005:183). Again, unlike BAH, the payment does not increase as rank does. Instead, one
rate is paid to enlisted members and one rate is paid to officers with the former being
higher than the latter. In 2007, enlisted members were paid $279.88 per month; officers
were paid $192.74. On average, these disbursements constitute 7.2 percent of enlisted
RMC and 2.6 percent of officer RMC.
Lastly, the federal income tax advantage is based on an individual member’s tax
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bracket, number of exemptions, student status, retirement contributions, deployment
status, and a series of other factors that may impact adjust gross income. The tax
advantage is estimated to constitute 6.1 percent of RMC on average if BAH and BAS
were taxed as regular income; however, the number varies greatly based on the member’s
tax situation.

Non-cash Benefits
Non-cash benefits, some of which that were considered in the MAC estimated by
the 10th QRMC, compose 21 percent of compensation to the average military member.
Healthcare and government housing are the two largest portions of non-cash benefits.
Healthcare expenses are difficult to quantify since military members do not pay
insurance premiums. Instead, the DoD provides healthcare to uniformed personnel and
their dependents free of charge through military treatment facilities. When care at
military treatment facilities is not possible, either in general or for the particular type of
care needed, a network of healthcare providers is available for those patients. Another
large component of non-cash benefits is government quarters.
In 2006, 43 percent of uniformed personnel resided in military housing. A member
either receives BAH payments or resides in government quarters while assigned at a
permanent duty location. Similar to BAH, the value of government quarters varies
greatly based on rank and number of dependents, and in limited instances, to position or
duty title. Many of the members who reside in government quarters are single juniorranked enlisted members in dormitory or barracks-styled housing. Housing managers
typically assign members with dependents to townhouses, duplexes, and single-family
homes when residing in government quarters.
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Deferred Benefits
Lastly, the DoD pays 31 percent of compensation to military members through a
series of deferred payments and benefits available upon retirement after 20 years. The
military retirement program is similar to most defined benefit plans in that DoD
calculates payments based upon on a formula (Savych, 2005:23). Under the current
system, the retirement pay is 2.5 percent of the member’s average of his or her “High-3”
years of basic pay multiplied by number of years of service. For example, a member
retiring after 20 years of service would be paid 50 percent (2.5% x 20) of their High-3
years of basic pay. DoD estimates that less than 15 percent of enlisted members and 47
percent of officers will remain in service long enough to retire from the military. We
perceive these percentages as significant when considering healthcare costs. Funding set
aside in 2006 for future healthcare liabilities totaled $13 billion, or approximately 87
percent of the cost for active duty healthcare in the same year (DoD, 2008b:23). The
DoD programs nearly as much resources for future healthcare liabilities of retirees as it
does for active duty personnel.
Military compensation comes in many forms; however, DoD only uses basic pay in
calculating the retirement annuity. The Office of the Actuary found that while a 20-year
retiree may be entitled to 50 percent of basic pay, the retiree only receives 34 percent of
RMC. Likewise, a 30-year retiree will receive 75 percent of basic pay but only 54
percent of RMC (Actuary, 2007:10).
The current retirement system available to eligible uniformed personnel is a defined
benefit plan. Employee retirement plans may otherwise be defined contributions plan.
The Department of Labor identifies a defined contribution plan as “a type of retirement
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plan in which the amount of the employer’s annual contribution is specified. Individual
accounts are set up for participants, and benefits are based on the amounts credited to the
accounts, plus any investment earnings on the money in the account.” In 2006, 90
percent of medium to large private employers provided some form of retirement plan, but
less than 40 percent offered a defined benefits plan (CBO, 2007:25).
For employees that do not plan to retire from the armed forces or desire to
supplement the military defined benefits plan upon retirement, the Thrift Savings Plan
(TSP) is available to them. The TSP offering may be perceived as an acknowledgement
of the inadequacy of the defined benefits retirement plan as a retention tool for targeted
military personnel. The TSP is very similar to the 401(k), the most common defined
contributions plan offered to civilian workers. It offers five investment mutual funds:
Government Securities Investment Fund (G), the Fixed Income Index Investment Fund
(F), the Common Stock Index Investment Fund (C), the Small Capitalization Stock Index
Investment Fund (S), and the International Stock Index Investment Fund (I). We
introduce the concept TSP because it may serve as an enabler of separation. Whereas
previously military members had an all-or-nothing retirement benefit available through
their employer, members now have a broad market investment tool that fully vests
investors before twenty years of service.
The vesting period differs greatly between the private sector and the armed
services. Most vesting rules for private-sector retirement plans are set out in the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. Employees in the civilian sector are
required to be fully vested after 7 years by federal law, but the funds are not available for
withdrawal without penalty until 59 ½ years of age (OSD, 2005:939). Employees are

22

entitled to their own contributions immediately; vesting rules govern when they are
entitled to employers’ contributions (CBO, 2007:16). Additionally, 401(k) withdrawals
receive no protection against the effects of inflation unless a portion of the investments is
made in tax-exempt government bonds. The military retirement annuity is not available
to personnel until they reach 20 years of service. While the vesting period may differ by
13 years, military retirement is valuable since it pays immediately following retirement.
This can be as early as 38 years of age for enlisted personnel and 42 for officers. In
contrast to 401(k) withdrawals, the DoD protects the military retirement annuity against
inflation by annually adjusting the payment.
Warner and Pleeter (2001), in research that reviewed how military members
preferred lump sum payments to a deferred annuity, estimated that military members’
personal discount rate ranged from zero to 30 percent. The work added that the vast
majority of military members personal discount rates exceed 18 percent. Since defined
contribution plans vest after a few years and nearly immediately become part of the
employee’s investment portfolio, and because junior military members highly discount
retirement benefits, civilian retirement programs are more valuable than the military
retirement annuity in early years of uniformed personnel careers. The value of military
pension increases as military members approach 20 years of service because the
probability of becoming eligible for military retirement increases. The uncertainties
regarding whether a member will become retirement eligible, or how long the member
will live, may affect member personal discount rates. The figures below provide a
graphical depiction of the 10th QRMC’s representation of MAC to include the value of
military retirement throughout a 20-year career of enlisted personnel and officers (DoD,
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2008b:33).

Figure 5: Military Annual Compensation for Enlisted Personnel, 2006
Source: (DoD, 2008b:33)
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Figure 6: Military Annual Compensation for Officers, 2006
Source: (DoD, 2008b:33)
Burrell (2007) attempted to capture the value of military retirement through present
value analysis of the pay gap between the military and civilian sectors. The author used
cumulative pay gap to represent the future value of an annuity due, but the dollar value
was not high enough to solve the rate of return equation, suggesting an infinite return.
The DoD annually adjusts non-disability retirement for inflation with Cost-of-living
adjustments (COLA) every December 1st to be reflected in basic pay the following
calendar year. The increase is calculated by the average percentage increase in the Urban
Wage Earner and Clerical Worker Consumer Price Index from the third quarter of the
previous year to the third quarter of the current year (Actuary, 2007:9). Additionally,
COLA and retirement pay do not reduce social security benefits. Since military
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personnel have paid social security taxes, they are entitled to full benefits in addition to
their military retirement annuity (Henning, 2006:4).

Retirement Debate
Why does military retirement continue to be a hot topic? Critics of non-disability
retirement contest that military retirement (1) retains too many average or below-average
performers on active duty, (2) does not encourage enough members to remain beyond 20
years of service, and (3) fully vests too late at the 20-year mark. Critics also suggest that
compensation policies inherited from 1940’s legislation are largely outdated (Williams,
2005:12). Rapidly increasing retiree-related benefits may “crowd out” defense resources
that could otherwise be used for manpower objectives and weapon system procurement
and sustainment. “The military retirement system has been cut twice since 1980, and
since 1993 has been the target of 17 legislative proposals to further reduce the value of
military retirement compensation” (Fenton 1999:2). Research suggests that substantial
savings, as much as $2.4 billion annually, are possible in the conversion to a defined
contribution retirement (Asch, Johnson, and Warner 1998: 48). Another argument rebuts
that with an annual $450 billion defense budget, retiree benefits are not significant
enough to “crowd out” defense capabilities, and that a $12-trillion Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) can adequately fund both military retirement benefits and present national
security objectives.
There are approximately 2.1 million military retirees and survivor benefit
recipients. This population and their associations’ efforts to secure more retiree benefits
is supported by four dynamics:
(1) the outpouring of nationwide nostalgia and support for the past heroism and
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current old-age needs of the “greatest generation” of World War II-era veterans;
(2) concern over problems the military services were having in recruiting and
retaining sufficient numbers of qualified personnel, which have been exacerbated
by ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to the extent to which
actual or perceived inadequacies in retirement benefits may have been
contributing to these problems; (3) the impression by many current of former
military personnel that the Clinton Administration was not favorably disposed
toward the military as an institution, leading to efforts to portray increased
retirement benefits as a palliative, and (4) in a reversal of the attitudes toward the
Clinton Administration, efforts to obtain more benefits from the Bush
Administration because it is perceived as being pro-military. And since
September 11, 2001, there has been a predictably dramatic increase in public and
congressional support for the Armed Forces (Henning, 2006:1).

The cost of the military retirement pension is budgeted through accrual accounting.
The DoD budget for each fiscal year includes an estimation of dollars plus interest
accrued in U.S. government securities needed to fund future military retirement annuities.
The budget outlays are transferred to the Military Retirement Fund (MRF), located in the
Income Security Function of the federal budget. Approximately 35 to 40 percent of
military basic pay costs are programmed in the annual DoD personnel budget for transfer
to the MRF. The interest it earns funds retiree pay for current active duty personnel in
the current fiscal year that will become eligible for retirement (Henning, 2006:2).
Since there is a slow increase in the number of retirees and survivor benefits
recipients, coupled with inflation, the cost of military retirement rises each year. The
table below indicates the costs of payments to current retirees (federal budget outlays)
and funds set aside for future retirees (accrual outlays) (Henning, 2006:8).
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Table 1: Military Retirement Outlays (billions of current dollars)

Source: (Henning, 2006:8)
The defense budget requirements for military retirement are costly, and under
current trends, will continue to climb. As explained earlier, the primary purpose of
military compensation is to support defense manpower objectives and ultimately the
national security strategy of the United States. Burrell (2007) found through panel
regression that the retirement system, a major component of compensation to uniformed
personnel, does influence a member’s decision to remain in the military or seek
alternative employment. In that study, enlisted members and officers were modeled
separately to estimate the relationships with retention to military retirement,
unemployment in the private sector, the existence of military contingencies, and
additional pay above and beyond ECI. Burrell stated the greatest potential in the thesis
lies in capturing the rate of return of our current retirement system.
Burrell’s enlisted model explained the majority of variation (R-squared 0.992) in
continuation rates, the variable used to describe retention. Only two variables were found
to be statistically significant, the rate of return of the MRF and whether or not a
contingency operation was in effect. He found that as the rate of the retirement plan
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increased an individual would have a greater propensity to remain in the military. The
model predicted that when a military contingency was in effect, an enlisted member was
more likely to remain on active duty. While the variable was statistically significant,
very little magnitude was associated with military contingency effects. The author
argued that high operations tempo may weigh heavily on enlisted member’s minds on
remaining in the military, but it is not heavily acted upon.
Burrell did not explain with success the variation in continuation rates among
officers that he modeled with enlisted members (R-squared 0.4769). The rate of return
of the MRF was found to be significant and to have the greatest magnitude of any
variable. However, the coefficient was unexpectedly found to be negative suggesting that
an increase in return raises the desire of officers to separate. Burrell provided two
possible explanations for this: (1) the rate of return was lower than expected and (2) MRF
is not a reliable proxy for military retirement’s effect on officer retention. The other
statistically significant variable in Burrell’s officer model was the unemployment rate.
Again, the model provided unexpected results because the coefficient on unemployment
is negative. This suggests that when unemployment increases, a suggestion that the
economy is suffering, retention among officers deceases. Burrell explained this through
the effect of a patriotic calling.
Moon (2004) in an analysis of surveys administered to separating members, found
patriotism to rank 36 of 38 variables associated with separating from active duty service.
This contests Burrell’s claim that military members would enter private industry to
“save” the economy in a calling to patriotism. Conducted in 2000, the surveys ranked
retirement programs #12, availability of dependent medical care #13, pay and allowances

29

#17, and availability of medical care #21 among 38 influences to leave active duty
service. The top three reasons for leaving the services were availability of comparable
civilian jobs, choice of job assignment, and say in base of assignment.
Scheuchner (1996) found that when looking at influencing factors in the separation
decision of officers, that availability of civilian jobs, say in the assignment process,
geographic stability, family separation, and pay and allowances were all statistically
significant. However, the magnitude of pay and allowances were lower than all of the
other variables.
In Burrell’s models, the author used a dummy variable to indicate whether a
contingency variable was in effect or not. This approach may fail to quantify the
relationship of retention with the intensity of a given military contingency. Bernal (2006)
wrote that studies indicate troops who served in Iraq are suffering from Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other problems on a scale not seen since the Vietnam War.
According to Walter Reed Medical Center Army Institute of Research, 19 to 21 percent
of troops who returned from combat deployments meet criteria for PTSD, depression, or
anxiety. Almost 82 percent of medical evacuations during Operation Iraqi Freedom were
due to psychiatric reasons as compared to 15 percent estimated during the Vietnam War.
The war in Iraq is the nation’s bloodiest war since the military ended conscription in
favor of an all-volunteer force (Williams, 2005:15). Hosek et al. (2006: xvi) found
increased operations tempo to be a significant factor on continued service for enlisted
personnel. The heavier burden placed on military personnel in contingency operations
may weigh heavily on the decision to stay-or-go because of increased operations, the
intensity of conflict, and chronic separation from family.
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Hoge (2006) found through research that combat duty in Iraq was associated with
high utilization of mental health services and attrition from military service after
deployments. PTSD was associated with a 60 percent increase of medical utilization by
patients for physical problems including respiratory, cardiovascular, neurological, and
musculoskeletal disorders.
The next chapter will lay the roadmap for modeling retention of Air Force officers
and enlisted members using the value of military retirement, economic factors external to
military service, and the intensity of military contingencies.
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III. Methodology
Research Question
How does the marginal effect of cash and non-cash military compensation
influence the decision of US Air Force personnel to continue active duty service to
retirement eligibility?
Overview
We engaged our research question with a review of previous literature, data
collection, and regression analysis to estimate the relationship between military
compensation and the retention of uniformed personnel in the US Air Force. We
collected data to develop a binomial response variable to quantitatively describe the
continuation decision of military members. In our research, we reviewed a series of
inputs that we believe have a relationship with the decision military members make
regarding retention and collected data to represent these variables. Additionally, we
controlled for differences in groups through the use of dummy variables for gender, rank,
Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC), commissioning source for officers, and citizenship
status for enlisted members.
We modeled our data at three points available in our sampling frame: the stay-orgo decision from 2001 to 2002, 2004 to 2005, and 2007 to 2008. We estimated officers
and enlisted personnel separately through a probit model for binary response. Each
model estimated the significant contributing factors in an individual’s decision to remain
in the service from year n to year n + 1.
Variables
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Continuation
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided individual level data on
Air Force personnel from the years 2001 to 2008. Technicians at DMDC developed the
sampling frame by randomly sampling a cohort from 20 percent of the active duty
personnel in 2001. The sampling frame included observations for personnel until 2008
unless a member separated or retired. We used the 2008 observations only for
developing the “Continuation” variable for 2007.
We defined the “Continuation” variable as our dependent variable. It is binary in
nature with a value of one when a member remains in the active duty Air Force from year
n to year n +1, or zero when the same member separates or retires before year n + 1. We
developed this variable by observing when a member existed in the cohort in the
subsequent year and coding the observation accordingly.
Unemployment Rates
Previous research revealed two interesting characteristics about unemployment
rates. Firstly, retention rates tend to be lower when unemployment rates are lower (Asch
et. Al., 2002). Secondly, during the time period observed in this study, availability of
comparable civilian jobs consistently ranked within the top three of thirty-eight
influencing factors for separation from active duty service (Moon, 2004). Additionally,
after reviewing the Conference Board Index of Leading Indicators, we expect
unemployment rates to be countercyclical, leading indicators of economic health. The
relationship infers that when unemployment falls, expansionary business cycles tend to
follow. Therefore, we used the unemployment rate to control for variance in the
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dependent variable by measuring both availability of comparable jobs and the health of
the US economy.
The Department of Defense measures comparability of military compensation to
civilian wages based on experience and education (DoD, 2008: 17). We explored the
same logic when we developed a proxy for availability of comparable jobs in the private
sector. A military member would pursue similar or higher earnings in private sector
employment according to experience and education required. Therefore, a military
member would measure civilian job availability by an unemployment rate according to
education levels. We retrieved the employment status of the civilian noninstitutional
population by gender and highest level of education attained from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics of the United States Department of Labor.
Value of Cash Compensation
OSD pays cash compensation through four components collectively defined as
Regular Military Compensation: basic pay, BAH, BAS, and the tax advantage incurred
because BAH and BAS are not taxed as income. We principally concerned ourselves
with basic pay for three reasons: (1) BAS only varied whether the member was enlisted
or an officer; (2) BAH differed according to rank, dependency status, and duty location
and our data set containing no information on the latter; and (3) the tax advantage cannot
be easily estimated without information on total household income, home ownership,
student status of dependents, and retirement contributions.
We are modeling officers and enlisted members separately, so including BAS
would only increase intercept value in each respective model.
We believe the value of having information on duty location would greatly benefit
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this research. Not only does duty location affect the pay entitlement; duty location may
affect exposure to the civilian labor market. For example, a military member may have a
higher probability of separating if they perceived a more robust labor market at their duty
station if they were located at Bolling AFB (Washington, DC) as compared to Holloman
AFB (Alamogordo, New Mexico). Since we do not have duty location, we eliminated
BAH altogether from the value of compensation.
We defined the value of cash compensation in two parts, the benefit and cost. We
first estimated the benefit as the discounted sum of cash flows of military compensation
for the average military career, deferred retirement annuity for the average rank at
retirement eligibility, and potential civilian earnings following retirement. We defined
the average military career by constructing a theoretical enlisted and officer career from
the average time-in-grade at the time of promotion for military members. Additionally,
we retrieved average time-in-grade information from the Information Delivery System of
the Office of Secretary of Defense. Furthermore, we estimated the annuity to be paid
from the earliest retirement eligibility at the age of 42 until the expected year of death at
84 years old for officers, or from 40 to 80 years of age for enlisted members (OA, 2007:
27). We also assumed that individuals, whether they retired or separated from the
military, would work until 62 years of age. To proxy for potential civilian wages, we
retrieved the mean earnings of workers 18 years old and over by education attainment at
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The second portion of the value of cash compensation
represented the cost of preferring military compensation. We assigned a negative value
to the sum of discounted cash flows of potential civilian wages. We considered this value
to be negative because when a military made the decision to remain in active duty
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service, he or she did so at the cost of potential civilian wages earned today. We defined
the value of cash compensation, therefore, as the sum of the compensation benefit and
cost of continuing in active duty service in the Air Force.
We expected that the marginal effect of the value of cash compensation would
increase the probability as the variable increased in value.
Intensity of Contingencies
Military contingencies geographically separate military members from their
families, expose our services to increased operations tempo, and pose an increased risk
for injury and death to our service members. Burrell (2007) developed this construct as a
dummy variable for years in which the armed services were engaged in combat. Using
this method assumed that all military contingencies have an equal effect on retention. A
study indicated troops who served in Iraq are suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD) and other problems on a scale not seen since the Vietnam War (Bernal,
2006:1). According to Walter Reed Medical Center Army Institute of Research, 19 to 21
percent of troops who returned from combat deployments meet criteria for PTSD,
depression, or anxiety. In our research, we will explore the number of annual military
casualties as a proxy for the intensity of military contingencies from year to year. The
Office of the Secretary of Defense publishes annual casualty numbers at its website.

Healthcare Benefit
When military members and their dependents receive healthcare, they do so
without incurring any personal financial cost. We considered this benefit difficult to
quantify because the member makes no election of how much coverage he or she will
receive. The member does not determine the dollars of coverage, the types of diseases or
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injuries to be covered, or whether the coverage adjusts over time. Additionally, the
medical benefit becomes more valuable as the member incurs more dependents. We
defined the value of the medical benefit as the out-of-pocket expenses that the member
avoided because they did not pay premiums or co-pays for private medical insurance.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services provided total out-of-pocket expense
data for policies of private industry workers. The data did not describe the cost of
workers’ coverage but the cost of the policy to the workers. We multiplied the out-ofpocket expenses avoided by the people in the military household to estimate the dollar
value of military healthcare coverage. Lastly, we divided by the civilian wages a member
would have earned had he or she separated to arrive at the percentage of income expected
to fund healthcare costs in civilian employment.
For example, a single first lieutenant with a bachelor’s degree in 2005 would
value healthcare coverage in the Air Force as: $1,228 (Average out-of-pocket expenses) *
1 (number of people requiring coverage) / $54,689 (mean wages for bachelor’s degree) or
2 percent. Likewise, an enlisted member with a family of four and some college
completed would value healthcare coverage as: $1,228 * 4 / $33,496 or 15 percent. We
used this method to estimate the percentage of expected civilian earnings that a member
would pay in out-of-pocket expenses for healthcare coverage if they were to separate
from active duty service in the Air Force. This estimate, although very simplistic, is
comparable to previous estimates. Hosek et al. (2005:34) suggested that single military
members should expect to pay about $1,000 per year in civilian coverage and over $3,000
(2005:35) for young families.
Gender
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Gender plays a role in the decision to participate in the labor force. Galor and
Weil found that “higher wages for women raise the cost of children relatively more than
they raise household income, and lead to a reduction in the number of children that
couples choose to have” (Galor and Weil, 1996: 375). For this reason, we expected that
when women decide to leave active duty service, it would more likely happen early in
their career before higher wages increased the opportunity cost of child bearing.
Controlling for gender separated the marginal effect that military compensation or other
factors may have on the probability of retaining men or women in active duty service
from year n to year n + 1. We defined males as the base group.
Rank
Our use of rank introduced the concept that we expect military members to base
their decision on what rank they hold. The military force structure promotes officers and
enlisted members to encourage performance and to increase desire for more
responsibility (OSD, 2005:9). “A promotion is not a reward for past service; it is an
advancement to a higher grade based on future potential as demonstrated by past
performance” (AFI 36-201, 2007:62). We expected as members are promoted, it would
increase the probability of the individuals to remain in active duty service. We note that
part of this effect can be explained with active duty service commitments. With a moveup-or-get-out policy in respect to promotions, we still find value in controlling for rank
because reaching promotions give a member the opportunity to continue serving.
Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC)
We expected differences in the probability of a member to remain in active duty
service when controlling for AFSC. We noted that availability of comparable civilian
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jobs consistently ranked within the top three of thirty-eight influencing factors for
separation from active duty service (Moon, 2004). Some AFSCs such as lawyers,
program managers, and dental technicians may have a more robust job pool to choose
from then those members that work as explosive ordinance technicians or boom operators
on tanker aircraft. Additionally, some AFSCs may experience a higher OPSTEMPO that
contributes adversely to retention rates. We separated our sampling frame in groups
according to the first digit of the AFSC such that we control for the differences among
those members in Operations (1), Maintenance/Logistics (2), Support (3), Medical/Dental
(4), Legal/Chaplain (5), Acquisition/Finance (6), Special Investigations (7), Special Duty
(8), and other AFSC identifier (9).
Methodology
Researchers often conduct regression analysis using continuous values to describe
the dependent variable. Observing the dependent variable on this scale allows it to take
on predicted values without restriction. The predicted value of the dependent variable
may be expressed as an integer, as a decimal point, and even a negative number when
regressed on the explanatory variables. While useful in other conditions, conventional
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis does not reveal the interesting relationship we are
concerned with in this thesis because its use constitutes a misspecification. We explain
the misspecification in the subsection titled “Limited Probability Model.”
We modeled the relationship of variables that influence the decision to either
remain in active duty service (stay) or pursue employment elsewhere (go). We define
this decision as the dependent variable “Continue.” The explained variable does not take
on continuous values; it is either “Stay” or “Go,” or binary in nature. Therefore, we
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model our independent variables to observe what factors are statistically significant in the
individual decision analysis to continue on active duty service in the Air Force from year
n to year n + 1.
Previous research modeled this relationship at the aggregate level. Burrell (2007)
used continuation rates to proxy for retention. Continuation rates represent the
percentage of Air personnel that continue in active duty service from one year to the next.
Burrell’s methodology observed how Air Force-level retention changes when factors
such as military retirement, unemployment rates, and annual pay raises change. We
model our data at the individual level. Researchers may use binary variables to describe
a qualitative event; such as dummy variables in the explanatory variables to allow for an
intercept change and/or a slope change amongst various groups. Instead, we use a binary
variable to describe a qualitative event: will an individual stay in the Air Force (y = 1) or
go (y = 0) with a given value of xn?
Limited Probability Model
In the event where our explanatory variables describe a binary outcome, such as
the decision to “stay or go” in this research, we may use the Limited Probability Model
(LPM). In the regression model
y = β0 + β1x1 + … + βkxk + u,
we interpret the coefficients on the independent variables slightly different when y takes
on two discrete outcomes than an in tradition OLS analysis. The dependent variable can
either be zero or one in the LPM. We consider “success” to be when y = 1. As a result,
the value by the regression estimates the probability of “success” given the values of the
array x. We express this mathematically as
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P(y = 1│x) = β0 + β1x1 + … + βkxk + u.
Therefore, we interpret the coefficients on βj as the increase in probability of “success” in
the qualitative event being observed. Some researchers may view the LPM as useful
because the mechanics are the same as OLS; the model is linear in the parameters in βj.
We highlight an inherent weakness with the LPM; potentially, the model response
may include predicted values where y > 1 or y < 0. Despite the fact that individuals may
claim to put forth 110% effort, a probability can only exist such that 0 < y < 1.
Additionally, the LPM restricts our estimations to linear interpretations. In this research,
we will estimate the relationship that number of dependents may have on a military
member’s decision to stay or go. In a household with a military member, going from
zero to one child may have more marginal influence on the probability of remaining in
the service than going from three to four children. The LPM fails to account for this
potential difference.
Probit Model for Binary Response
We discussed the inherent weaknesses found in the Linear Probability Model.
Woolridge (2004: 583) states “the two most important disadvantages are that the fitted
probabilities can be less than zero or greater than one and the partial effect of any
explanatory variable is constant.” The simplicity and weaknesses of LPM can be
overcome through the use of the Probit, Logit, or Tobit Model for Binary Response. We
used probit because the model assumes the error term is normally distributed and probit
modeling is most commonly used in econometrics.
To address the first of the limitations we find in the LPM, we define our model
such that
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where we had a continuous, always-increasing function that will return a response
probability that was equal to zero or one. As defined above, we estimated the effects of xi
on the response probability P(y = 1│x), or that a military member remained in the Air
Force from year n to year n + 1 with the probit binary response model. We defined the
opposite case, when a member separated or retired, as

We modeled the relationship that the independent variables had with the increase in
probability of our response variable with the Eviews 6® statistical package software. We
estimated the parameters on xi, as a result of the specifications above, with the maximum
likelihood function expressed as:

The latent variable model differed from OLS analysis here. In OLS, the
coefficient on βk estimated the ceteris paribus effect of xk on the dependent variable, y.
In a binary response model, the sign of the coefficient on the array on independent
variables estimated the respective variable’s influence on the probability of “success.” In
the latent variable model, we select a threshold such that when yi* exceeds it,

We interpreted this expression as when the latent variable exceeded a certain value,
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here given as value of zero, the model returned a value of one or a predicted “success.”
We are using the probit model for binary response such that

where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.
(Eviews, 2007: 211).
Modeling our data in a probit model for binary response estimated the marginal
effect that cash and noncash elements of military compensation had on the probability of
successfully retain our Air Force men and women. We discuss our data and model
analysis in the next section, Chapter 4.
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IV. Data and Analysis
Our data contained a random sample of officers and enlisted members from the
US Air Force in 2001. That cohort constituted 20 percent of the 2001 population and our
data tracked the cohort until 2008. We modeled our data at three points available in our
sampling frame: the stay-or-go decision from 2001 to 2002, 2004 to 2005, and 2007 to
2008. We emphasize that the data did not introduce new observations to the sampling
frame in subsequent years. To the contrary, our data for year n contained only survivors
from year n - 1. Therefore, we observed the cohort’s years of service for each
observation grow by one each year.
We placed a few restrictions on the data to constrain our analysis to observations
that realistically faced a stay-or-go decision. Burrell (2007) made similar constraints that
we adopted; Burrell eliminated individuals with the ranks of E1 through E4 and O1
through O2 in his analysis because the continuation rates were nearly 100 percent. We
associated those high retention rates with active duty service commitments inherent when
a member begins military service: four to six years for enlisted members and four to five
years for officers. For this, we eliminated all observations with less than four years of
service because enlisted members and officers, without a waiver to an active duty service
commitment, cannot voluntarily separate from the Air Force.
Lastly, we eliminated all observations with greater than 18 years of service. We
wanted to measure the influence of cash compensation on the decision to remain in active
duty service up until retirement eligibility. Individuals nearing retirement eligibility may
retire at varying points within a calendar year, and therefore we found much variance for
military members with 19 years of service. The retention rates for 18 and 19 years both
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exceed 99 percent; however, the retention rate following 20 years of service falls
tremendously to 68 and 73 percent for officers and enlisted members, respectively.
Restricting the upper bound for years of service at 18 eliminated the possibility of
measuring observations that retire early on in their eligibility.
In order to ease interpretation of the model, we introduce a few terms. For a
military member that continued service in a given year or separated, we defined the
individuals as survivors or nonsurvivors, respectively. We also grouped members by
years of service such that: Zone 1 = 4 – 7 years of service, Zone 2 = 8 – 11 years of
service, Zone 3 = 12 – 15 years of service, and Zone 4 = 16 – 18 years of service.
In our discussion of results, we do not include the coefficients on x from our
regression equation because the interpretation of the value differs greatly from traditional
OLS. The coefficient in a probit model does not estimate the partial effect that an
independent variable has on the probability of success. This characterizes one of the
strengths of the probit model; the binary response model allows nonlinear effects of x on
P(continue = 1). Instead, the coefficient is used to estimate the marginal effect when the
independent variable changes from one specific value to another. For example, we could
use the coefficients to estimate the probability of a military member continuing in service
when the unemployment rate falls from 5.1 to 4.3 percent in 2004, or the increase in job
opportunity that a male high school graduate observed when he acquired an associate
degree. Since the coefficients are not linear in their parameters, we would expect the
marginal effect to be smaller for that change as compared to a change in the
unemployment rate from 5.1 to 2.7 percent, or when a male high school graduate
acquired a baccalaureate degree in 2004.
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In regards to policy analysis, we are more concerned with the direction of the
marginal effect of statistically significant variables. As a result, we report the sign
associated with significant inputs but do not discuss the magnitude of the effect. This
method
Officer Personnel
Officer Results for 2001
We observed two significant variables in this model, the value of cash
compensation and the unemployment rate. We found the value of cash compensation to
be significant for officers in Zone 1 and the unemployment rate for officers in Zones 1, 2,
and 3.
Table 2. Statistically Significant Variables for Officer Stay-or-Go Decision (2001)
Variable

Zone 1

Cash Compensation
Medical Benefits
Unemployment Rate
R-Squared: 0.06

+x*

Zone 2

Zone 3

Zone 4

-x*
-x*
-x*
"x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level

The value of cash compensation’s influence on the stay-or-go decision displayed
the expected direction of influence, positive. The relationship implied that as the value of
cash compensation inherent in military service increased above the value of earning
civilian wages today, the probability of remaining in active duty service one additional
year increased. We used annual retention rates to construct the table below to estimate
the number of officers for every 100 that are lost during the specified range of years.
Zone 1, which included officers with four to seven years of service, contained the largest
attrition in manpower among officers. In efforts to retain the optimal mix of forces for
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mission sustainment, the DoD should hope that compensation packages for Zone 1 favor
retention of high quality officers since attrition is at its highest.
Table 3. 2001 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Officers)
Range
Zone 0
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4

YOS
0–3
4–7
8 – 11
12 – 15
16 – 19

Lost Officers
6
33
21
9
1

Remaining

% Lost
94
61
40
31
30

6.00%
35.11%
34.43%
22.50%
3.23%

Source: OSD Information Delivery System
Our findings provided that officers with four to seven years of service would rather defer
earning civilian wages until after retirement eligibility. We did not observe statistically
significant relationships between retention and the values of cash compensation for Zones
2 through 4.
Additionally, we found a statistically significant relationship between
unemployment rates and the retention of officers in Zones 1 through 3; however, at first
glance, the direction of the influence may seem counterintuitive. The model’s results
suggest the marginal effects of unemployment decreases the probability of those military
officers becoming survivors; however we expect that military officers would prefer
“safe” government employment when job opportunities lag in the private sector. When
the economy is weak and unemployment rates increase, there are fewer jobs for those
entering the civilian labor market. An investigation in the data reveals some items
worthy of note.
We used unemployment rates based on two factors: gender and highest level of
education attained. The unemployment rates in our data set vary among the following
education levels: non-high school graduate, high school diploma, some college and/or
associate degree, and baccalaureate degree and above. In the officer model for 2001, we
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observe smaller than 1 percent of the sample to have less than a four-year degree in each
of Zones 1, 2, and 3. The percentage for females with at least a baccalaureate degree in
each respective zone is 21.3, 16.4, and 16.1 percent. Therefore, the marginal effect of the
unemployment rate on officer retention controls more for job opportunity according to
gender than levels of education. We expected that women separating from military
service would do so earlier in a career rather than later since the opportunity cost
associated with bearing children becomes prohibitively more expensive as wages
increase. We strengthen that claim when we note that 36 percent of females with at least
four-year degrees have between four to seven years of service as compared to 27 percent
of males with the same level of education. While the proportions stay relatively stable
for males in subsequent groups, we observed a progressive drop for females. This
suggests that males and females perceived the stay-or-go decision differently as their
careers progressed. Therefore, the negative marginal effect of unemployment rates
measures the greater attrition for females with baccalaureate degrees and above when
compared to males.
Officer Results for 2004
We observed two significant variables in this model, the value of cash
compensation and the unemployment rate for officers with 4 to 7 years of active duty
service and the value of the medical benefit for officers with 8 to 11 years of active duty
service.

48

Table 4. Statistically Significant Variables for Officer Stay-or-Go Decision (2004)
Variable

Zone 1

Cash Compensation
Medical Benefits
Unemployment
R t
R-Squared:
0.07

+x*

Zone 2

Zone 3

Zone 4

-x
"x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level

Just as we noted in the 2001 model, the DoD benefits from the positive marginal
effect of the value of military cash compensation on retention especially during periods
where DoD suffered from its highest attrition rates. We see below that Zone 1 produced
the largest drops in military officers again. In our 2004 model, we estimated that officers
with four to seven years of service prefer to wait until after retirement eligibility to earn
civilian wages because the value of cash compensation’s marginal effect on the
probability of continuing in the service is positive. We actually observed a stronger
relationship on this variable and interaction than in the 2001 model; this estimation is
confirmed when we see that retention in 2001 was 90.97 percent as compared to 91.5
percent for the same group in 2004.
Table 5. 2004 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Officers)
Range
Zone 0
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4

YOS
0–3
4–7
8 – 11
12 – 15
16 – 19

Lost Officers
6
26
14
5
2

Remaining

% Lost
94
68
54
49
47

6.00%
27.66%
20.59%
9.26%
4.08%

Source: OSD Information Delivery System
The 2004 model rendered unexpected results for the value of medical benefits.
We anticipated that when expected out-of-pocket expenses increased, the military
member would prefer to remain in active duty service to avoid out-of-pocket expenses
inherent in private sector employment. We observed that the marginal effect of the
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medical benefit decreased the probability of officers with eight to eleven years of service
to remain in the Air Force. A non-parametric analysis of the data revealed some valuable
explanation of the finding.
We divided the observations in Zone 2 into quartiles according to the value of the
medical benefit variable such that the first quartile represented those officers with the
highest values. The quartiles were not included in the regression model; the quartiles are
examined to analyze what may possibly explain the results from our regression. Within
the quartiles, we observed an imbalance in the proportion of females. We recorded these
values in the table below along with the corresponding retention rates of each group. The
value of the military medical benefit is the average out-of-pocket expenses a similar
civilian employee paid. We defined “similar” as a civilian employee with the same
number of dependents and highest level of education attained. Therefore, the female
population of officers in Zone 2 looked like we expected them to: as the number of
dependents grew, there were fewer females in the sampling frame.
Table 6. Analysis of Medical Benefit Influence on Officer Retention in Zone 2 (2004)
Quartiles
First
Second
Third
Fourth

Observations
474
474
474
474

% Female
7.5
11.4
18.6
24.2

Female

Male
74.3
94.6
89.2
94.2

94.5
94.5
96.9
96.4

We found an interesting detail in the retention comparison among genders for the first
quartile, or when the value of medical benefits is greater: the retention rates differ by
more than 20 percent. We believe this may explain the unexpected result of the marginal
effect of the medical benefit on the probability of remaining in the service. This follows
the claim that females separate from active duty service sooner as compared to males.
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Additionally, we observed in the first two quartiles that every female that separated from
the Air Force was married. Perhaps being married, and the possibility of having dualincome households, afforded these nonsurvivor females the ability to separate because
medical needs of dependents were taken care of otherwise.
Officer Results for 2007
We observed three significant variables in the 2007 model: the value of cash
compensation for officers with eight to eleven years of service, the value of the medical
benefit for officers with eight to eleven years of service, and the unemployment rate for
officers with four to seven years of service and officers with twelve to fifteen years.
Table 7. Statistically Significant Variables for Officer Stay-or-Go Decision (2007)
Variable

Zone 1

Cash Compensation
Medical Benefits

Zone 2

Zone 3

Zone 4

-x
+x*

Unemployment

-x*

+x*

R-Squared: 0.17

"x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level

We found the value of cash compensation had a negative marginal effect on the
probability of retention of officers with eight to eleven years of service. The Air Force
employed a voluntary separation payment (VSP) incentive program then. Since the Air
Force had an overage of 8,000 officers, it used VSP to incentivize those officers with six
to exactly twelve years of service to voluntarily separate in rebalancing the forces. In
2007, the Air Force experienced an 82.7 percent retention rate for officers in Zone 2 as
compared to 92 and 94.7 percent for the same zone in 2001 and 2004, respectively. At
the time, active duty service commitments were waived for officers normally not eligible
for separation due to promotions, permanent changes-of-station, and commitments
associated with the use of education benefits.
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VSP provided officers with payments that may have otherwise stayed in the Air
Force. For example, we estimated the present value of future cash flows that a major
with a baccalaureate degree and eleven years of active duty service as follows:
Present Value of Military Pay: $557,037
Present Value of Military Retirement Annuity Payments: $93,854
Present Value of Civilian Wages: - $532,114
We associated civilian wages with a negative sign because the military member accepts
military compensation at the opportunity cost of civilian wages that could be earned
today. In this example, the value of cash compensation was $118,777, but with a VSP
payment of $147,913, the opportunity cost of not separating brought the value of cash
compensation down to - $29,136. We remind that when the value of cash compensation
carries a negative sign, the present value of future cash flows associated with civilian
wages outweigh the compensation benefit inherent with serving in the military until
retirement eligibility. Since VSP payments are paid in today’s dollars without the effects
of discounting, and calculated based on years of service and basic pay, an increase in
military compensation actually increased the value of the VSP. As a result, the value of
cash compensation had a negative marginal effect on the probability of retaining Air
Force officers with eight to eleven years of active duty service.
We observed statistical significance on the value of medical benefit for military
officers with eight to eleven years of service. We highlighted the force shaping dynamic
on this group in 2007. With VSP payments, enterprising military officers took advantage
of incentives to separate from the Air Force, relatively safe employment, for riskier
prospects in the private sector. Military members may have had a higher propensity to
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separate from active duty service when the members did not have dependents. We
divided the sampling frame into quartiles according to ascending values of perceived
medical benefit.
Table 8. Analysis of Medical Benefit Influence on Officer Retention (2007)
Zone 2 (Officers with 4 - 7 YOS)
Range
Observations
Retention %
Quartile 1
450
79.11%
Quartile 2
450
81.33%
Quartile 3
451
84.70%
Quartile 4
450
85.56%

Average # of Dependents
Non-survivors
Survivors
0.26
0.38
1.23
1.37
2.45
2.65
3.81
3.85

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center
We saw that as the average number of dependents grew from one quartile to the next, the
aggregate retention rates did as well. Additionally, within the quartiles, we observed that
the average number of dependents increased from non-survivors to survivors. Therefore,
those military members that remained in the service with four to seven years may have
done so because VSP did not provide the financial stability required by members with
families. Air Force officers with families did not pursue risky employment with the same
frequency as those members with fewer dependents.
In 2001, we had an unexpected result when our model rendered a negative
marginal effect of the unemployment rate on the probability of remaining on active duty
service. We realized a negative effect again for the unemployment rate in 2007 on the
retention of military officers with four to seven years. Smaller than one percent of
officers had less than a four-year degree in Zone 1, but there were 20.3 percent of females
that had baccalaureate degrees or higher. Our regression, similar to the officer model for
2001, may have been influenced more by the difference in retention among males and
females. While exploring possible differences in attrition behavior between the two
genders, we observed that the Air Force realized retention rates of 62.6 and 77.2 percent
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for females and males, respectively, for officers in 2004. Therefore, the unemployment
rate measured the greater propensity of similarly educated females as compared to males
to leave military service early on in their careers.
The unemployment rate had a significant marginal effect on the probability of
retaining military officers with twelve to fifteen years of service, as well; however, for
this zone the relationship was a positive one. Overall, we saw high retention rates for this
subgroup, 97.26 percent, and expected such because of the approach towards retirement
eligibility and the stream of cash flows expected following retirement. Civilian workers
with less than a four-year degree suffered worse unemployment rates than workers that
had completed a bachelor degree program. Therefore, those military officers with less
than a four-year degree were exposed to more risk (higher unemployment rate) and less
return (lower mean wages) than those officers that separated with at least a baccalaureate
degree. Females with four-year degrees faced a higher unemployment rate than their
male counterparts. We noted that females tend to leave the labor market early so we
expected retention rates of females to improve more quickly than males. In our sampling
frame, the retention rates of female officers confirmed this expectation: 97.6 percent for
females and 97.2 percent for males with at least four-year degrees.
Enlisted Personnel
Enlisted Results for 2001
We observed three statistically significant variables in the 2001 model, the value of cash
compensation for enlisted members with eight to eleven and twelve to fifteen years of
active duty service; the value of medical benefits for members with four to seven years of
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service; and the unemployment rate for enlisted personnel with four to seven and eight to
eleven years of service.
Table 9. Statistically Significant Variables for Enlisted Stay-or-Go Decision (2001)
Variable

Zone 1

Zone 2

Zone 3

+x*

+x*

Zone 4

Cash Compensation
Medical Benefits

+x*

Unemployment
R-Squared: 0.06

-x
-x
"x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level

The table below displays the retention rates according to zone, a range of four
years, leading up to retirement eligibility. We observed far more aggressive attrition
rates for enlisted members as compared to officers in the earlier stages of their respective
military careers. Only 80 percent of enlisted members remained in the service after the
third year; 94 percent of officers were still in uniform after the same length of time. This
may be a result of greater opportunities that exist for officers later in their military careers
than enlisted personnel and the force structure design for enlisted personnel.
Table 10. 2001 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Enlisted)
Range
Zone 0
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4

YOS
0–3
4–7
8 – 11
12 – 15
16 – 19

Lost Enlisted
20
43
13
4
0

Remaining
80
37
24
20
20

% Lost
20.00%
53.75%
35.14%
16.67%
0.00%

Source: OSD Information Delivery System
The optimal mix of forces by rank and skill is outside of the scope of this
research, but we do find it reasonable to believe that the Air Force desired a high number
of enlisted recruits for at least two reasons: (1) to fill entry-level positions that did not
require much experience for proficiency and (2) to have enough enlisted members to fill
non-commissioned officer positions following a series of promotions later in their
respective careers. The purpose of military compensation is to maintain the optimal mix
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of forces to carry out mission requirements according to national security objectives. We
expect the DoD would define compensation values to retain better-qualified enlisted
members to continue in service and, as a result, less qualified enlisted members would
self-identify for separation if they did not feel that they could compete for advanced
promotions.
These statements support the findings from our model of 2001 enlisted personnel.
We found the value of cash compensation had a positive marginal effect on the
probability of enlisted personnel with eight to eleven and twelve to fifteen years of
service. The DoD has long-term incentives such as deferred retirement and medical
benefits to provide motivation to high quality recruits to remain in service that will be
competitive for advanced promotion and job placement later in their career. For every
100 military members that enlisted in a given year, according to 2001 retention rates, 37
would remain at the end of the 7th active duty service year; over the course of the next 13
years, the Air Force expected that better than 50 percent of those still in uniform would
be retained until retirement eligibility. We conclude that the positive marginal effect on
the probability of retention on the personnel with seven to fifteen years of service
measured the retention of personnel that intended to become career military men and
women, and as a result, fill senior enlisted non-commissioned officer ranks.
We observed a positive marginal effect of medical benefits on the probability of
retaining enlisted personnel with four to seven years of service. We did not find
significance on the value of cash compensation for the same group, so enlisted members
in this category, when preferring military service to civilian employment, did so because
of this element of non-cash compensation. Members desired non-cash benefits above the
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defined compensation received as either pay or deferred annuity payments when the
number of dependents increased. For example, SSgt X amd SSgt Y had the same number
years of service and education level, so both could expect similar civilian wages should
they separate. If SSgt X was single with zero dependents and SSgt Y maintained a
family of four, SSgt Y needed to earn higher civilian dollars—after paying for medical
insurance premiums and co-pays for his dependents—to maintain the same purchasing
power as SSgt X.
We found the unemployment rate’s marginal effect on the probability of retaining
enlisted members with four to seven and eight to eleven years of service to be negative.
The relationship infers that when the unemployment rate climbed, retention went down.
We observed something similar for 2001 in the officer model, but were able to attribute
much of this effect to gender rather than education levels. In Zone 1, enlisted service
members were either in their first or second enlistment term and the overall retention rate
was 98.2 percent. We attribute the 100 percent retention rate among those members with
at four-year degree to active duty service commitments associated with taking advantage
of tuition assistance or other education benefits. Additionally, the enlisted members that
pursued four-year degrees may have shared similar characteristics with the enlisted
members that served in the military until or beyond retirement eligibility. The second
claim helped explain why we also observed a negative relationship with the
unemployment variable and enlisted members with eight to eleven years. Enlisted
personnel increased the probability of serving to retirement eligibility when they emerged
from their eleventh year of service. Therefore, we anticipate greater retention among
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those members with four-year degrees, especially if they were accepted and completed a
commissioning program to serve as an active duty military officer.
Enlisted Results for 2004
We observed two statistically significant variables in the 2004 model, the value of
cash compensation for enlisted members with four to seven, eight to eleven, and sixteen
to eighteen active duty service years; and the value of medical benefit for members with
four to seven years of service.
Table 11. Statistically Significant Variables for Enlisted Stay-or-Go Decision (2004)
Variable
Cash Compensation

Zone 1
+x

Zone 2
+x*

Zone 3

Zone 4
+x*

Medical Benefits
Unemployment

+x*

R-Squared: 0.08

"x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level

-x*

Our model returned a positive marginal effect of the value of cash compensation
on the probability of retention for enlisted personnel with four to seven years. We
suggest that a response to the recession following the 9/11 tragedy may have contributed
to enlisted members making their continuation decision did so because members
perceived the present value of cash flows inherent in military service greater than earning
civilian wages today. This may explain why we observed an improvement in attrition in
Zone 1 from 53.8 percent in 2001 to 39.5 percent in 2004. Following the recession,
junior enlisted Airmen preferred “safe” government employment to riskier prospects
despite the fact that they could have earned higher wages over the course of their lives
even if they didn’t pursue further education.
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Table 12. 2004 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Enlisted)
Range
Zone 0
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4

YOS
0–3
4–7
8 – 11
12 – 15
16 – 19

Lost Enlisted
24
30
12
3
1

Remaining
76
46
34
31
30

% Lost
24.00%
39.47%
26.09%
8.82%
3.23%

Source: OSD Information Delivery System
We suggested after seeing the slowdown in attrition following Zone 2 that
enlisted personnel tend to become career military service members following their
eleventh year in the Air Force. We saw that for every 100 enlisted members beginning
service in the same year, according to 2004 retention rates, 34 continued on after eleven
years; however, only four would separate before retirement eligibility over the course of
the next nine years. The marginal effect of the value of cash compensation increased the
probability of bringing members to the critical eleven-year point that gave the Air Force
its senior enlisted corps.
Additionally, deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism provided
monetary incentive through entitlements such as Combat Zone Tax Exclusion, Family
Separation Allowance, and Hazardous Duty Pay. These incentives may have further
increased the value of military compensation over civilian earnings.
The value of cash compensation had a positive marginal effect on the retention of
enlisted members in Zone 4, or members with sixteen and eighteen years of service and
approaching retirement eligibility. We observed that 99.4 percent of those observations
perceived more value in serving and subsequently retiring from the military over
separating and earning civilian wages today. We highlight that attrition for enlisted
members in Zones 3 and 4 were 16.7 percent and smaller than one percent, respectively,
to support the tendency of enlisted Airmen choosing career military service if they
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completed eleven years of service. We expected the high retention rates during Zone 4;
we see from our analysis that the value of cash compensation, largely because of the
military retirement annuity, was the dominating factor above non-cash compensation and
the economy for this high retention rate.
We observed a negative marginal effect that described the influence of the value
of medical benefits on the probability of retaining enlisted personnel with four to seven
years of service. To investigate the result, we analyzed how the continuation rates of
females within Zone 1 compared when dividing the group into quartiles according to
ascending value of medical benefit. We noted before that we expect females to separate
or retire before the opportunity cost of child bearing became increasingly expensive. We
saw here that as the value of medical benefit increased, females separated at a faster rate.
The retention for the quartiles was 94.4, 93.2, 89.0, and 84.2 percent for females. We
observed a very different effect for males; the respective retention rates for the quartiles
were 89.7, 89.2, 96.4, and 94.4 percent. Therefore, the negative marginal effect of the
value of medical benefit on the probability of retaining personnel with four to seven years
may have captured the tendency of females to separate from service for child bearing.
We noticed that as the number of dependents grew for females, they were more likely to
separate and perhaps stay at home with the children.
Enlisted Results for 2007
We observed three statistically significant variables in the 2007 model, the value
of cash compensation for enlisted members of all years of service, the value of medical
benefit for members with four to seven years of service and eight to eleven years, and the
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unemployment rate for enlisted personnel with four to seven years of service and eight to
eleven years.
Table 13. Statistically Significant Variables for Enlisted Stay-or-Go Decision (2007)
Variable

Zone 1

Zone 2

Zone 3

Zone 4

Cash Compensation
Medical Benefits
Unemployment

+x*
+x
-x*

+x*
+x*
-x*

+x*

+x*

R-Squared: 0.08

"x": significant at .05; "*": significant at .01 level

We saw from the table below that enlisted personnel separated at a faster rate in
early years as compared to officers so the value of cash compensation’s played a larger
role in retention for enlisted members.
Table 14. 2007 Retention (Remaining For Every 100 Enlisted)
Range
Zone 0
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4

YOS
0–3
4–7
8 – 11
12 – 15
16 – 19

Lost Enlisted
21
44
12
3
1

Remaining
79
35
23
20
19

% Lost
21.00%
55.70%
34.29%
13.04%
5.00%

Source: OSD Information Delivery System
Our model provided that the value of cash compensation inherent in remaining in the Air
Force to retirement eligibility had a positive marginal effect on the probability of all
enlisted members continuing in service for one more year. The DoD should appreciate
the finding that when the value of remaining in the military—the summation of cash
flows found in military compensation, deferred retirement annuity payments, and the
civilian earnings expected following retirement until the age of 62—increased against the
value of civilians earned today until retirement, the probability of retention of enlisted
personnel with four to eighteen years of service increased. The favorable results may
have been linked to the added benefit of contingency entitlements for those members that
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deployed in support of the Global War on Terror since the largest benefit, the income tax
exemption, was proportionally linked to the value of basic pay.
Our modeled estimated a positive marginal effect of the value of medical benefits
on the probability of remaining in the service for enlisted members with four to seven
years of service and eight to eleven years. We found a noteworthy item regarding the
value of medical benefit, or the percentage of expected civilian earnings that would go to
out-of-pocket medical expenses outside of private medical insurance. Within the Zone 1
subgroup, 78.5 enlisted members had only high school diplomas and 21.5 had at least an
associate degree. The respective rates for those members were 88.8 percent and 85.2
percent. We found of the enlisted members in Zone 2, 69.3 percent had less than an
associate degree, 25.5 percent had an associate degree, and 5.2 percent had at least a fouryear degree. The retention rates for those groups were 92.3, 90.4, and 89.2 percent,
respectively. We concluded that enlisted members with less than an associate degree and
not enough valuable experience did not anticipate that they would find high enough
wages to cover the medical needs of themselves and their dependents and therefore had
higher retention rates.
We observed a negative marginal effect of unemployment rates on the probability
of retention of enlisted members with four to seven and eight to eleven years of service.
The tables below contain retention rates for the different groups by their respective
unemployment rates according to gender and highest level of education attained.
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Table 15. Analysis of Unemployment Influence on Enlisted Retention in Zone 1 (2007)
Education
4 Year+ (M)
4 Year+ (F)
Some College (M)
Some College (F)
High School (F)
High School (M)

Unemployment
1.90%
2.10%
3.40%
3.70%
4.30%
4.40%

Observations
39
20
293
196
447
1553

Retention
94.90%
85.00%
84.00%
84.70%
86.10%
89.60%

Table 16. Analysis of Unemployment Influence on Enlisted Retention in Zone 2 (2007)
Education
4 Year+ (M)
4 Year+ (F)
Some College (M)
Some College (F)
High School (F)
High School (M)
No High School (M)

Unemployment
1.90%
2.10%
3.40%
3.70%
4.30%
4.40%
8.20%

Observations
255
114
1251
548
944
3948
1

Retention
91.00%
85.10%
89.10%
88.10%
90.30%
91.70%
100.00%

We believe the active duty service commitments that enlisted members incur when using
educational benefits may influence retention by removing the ability to make a decision.
This would explain why retention rates are higher for members with four-year degrees
than those with only some college or associate degrees despite the fact that those with
four-year degrees would expect higher civilian wages. The members with less than a
four-year degree but some college may have stopped attending school altogether or
temporarily to attend college as a civilian without incurring active service commitments.
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V. Conclusion
This chapter will address the findings, the validity of those findings, and policy
implications. Lastly, we offer suggestions to expand on this research to improve the
robustness of the model.
Summary and Implications
After reviewing government publications, peer-review journals, independent
research, theses, and dissertations we saw potential for addition to the body of knowledge
of military retention. Previous work focused on Air Force personnel as a whole and, in
turn, virtually treated all individuals as the average military member. Service in the
armed forces is an emotional decision. Members join for a variety of personal reasons
and the reasons surrounding their retention are just as personal. Air Force men and
women respond to job challenges, assignments, contingencies, separation from family,
and other decision criteria differently. Military compensation, whether cash or non-cash,
serves as an enabler of continuation but is not the sole instrument in retention.
So how do military members respond to this enabler of continuation when
modeled at the individual level? Our findings suggest that officers with four to seven
years of service respond positively to compensation inherent in a military career over a
civilian one. The Air Force suffers the largest rate of attrition of officers during the fourto seven-year marks. The DoD should hope that during a vulnerable period of retention,
the remaining members are the best mix of forces to field senior positions. Enlisted
personnel respond positively to military compensation as well. We found that enlisted
members tend to separate more aggressively as compared to officers; however, as they
emerge from the seven-year mark, the probability of them continuing to serve to
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retirement eligibility greatly improves. For these groups of officers and enlisted
members, the value of cash compensation has a statistically significant impact on their
decision to continue. In order to retain the caliber of military members needed to field
mid-level and subsequently senior leadership positions, military compensation must be
adequate enough to retain high-quality members to effectively sustain operations.
We also observed two interesting details regarding gender and education levels.
We found the quit behavior between males and females do not follow the same pattern.
When a female serves in active duty, she is more likely to be have less than eight years of
service because females tend to separate sooner in their careers rather than later.
Additionally, we observed statistically significant differences among enlisted members
with varying levels of education. Enlisted personnel with four-year degrees tend to
remain in the Air Force. The military member that pursues education to better their
standing may share similar characteristics with those members that serve in the Air Force
to retirement eligibility.
Suggestions For Further Research
Our research would have greatly benefited from the use of time series analysis.
We planned to estimate the probability of a military member’s decision to continue in
military service over time with a binary response probit model over time with our cohort;
however, time did not permit such an ambitious endeavor. Although our research
revealed interesting points, low R-Squared values for our models suggest that the
methodology did not suit the variance in our dependent variable with consistent accuracy.
Our data contained a key variable for each observation and tracked the survivors across
time from 2001 to 2008. Time series analysis could estimate how the influence of cash
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and non-cash compensation on the individual affected the probability of continuation in
service. Instead, in the interest of time, we were required to estimate with the much less
robust method of cross-sectional analysis.
Cross-sectional analysis greatly changed our methodology. Deferring to this
methodology changed the interpretation of some of our variables, led to the omission of
variables, and prevented the ability to control for groups that we found interest in
estimating differences for.
We had a series of dummy variables such as gender, AFSC, rank, and deployment
status. When estimating across a single year, we encountered the problem associated
with perfect predictions. For example, we may have experienced variance in the
dependent variable for female majors that served in the medical support group of AFSCs;
however, when we included the dummy variable for deployment, we could have observed
that 100 percent of female medical officers with the rank of major and deployed
continued in service. When an event such as this occurs, we cannot control for
differences among groups even when we have a large sample size because no difference
may exist.
Our dataset included information on the deployment status of each military
member in a particular year. In time-series analysis, we could have measured the impact
of multiple deployments on a member’s decision to continue in service. We anticipated
the grueling challenges of increased operations tempo and chronic separation from family
would better explain the variance found in the decision to stay-or-go than whether the
member was deployed in a given year.
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When a member deployed for four, six, or twelve months it was very likely he or
she would continue in service the following year because deployments could potentially
cross calendar years. Additionally, military members faced active duty service
commitments and may not have had the ability to separate in the time between
redeploying and the end of the calendar year. Also of note, the Air Force provided
monetary incentive in the form of additional entitlements to those members that deployed
in support of contingency operations.
A single deployment and the extra income associated with it may not have
dissuaded a member from continuing in service, but subsequent deployments could have
diminished the value of the monetary incentives. Without the benefit of a lagged
dependent variable or the ability to quantify for multiple deployments, the deployment
status did not explain the variance it would have with the benefit of time series analysis.
Ultimately, we did not find relevance for this variable in cross-sectional analysis and
eliminated it from our analysis.
We noted unexpected results from the unemployment variable for some groups at
first glance; however, further analysis provided better explanation of what our model had
estimated. In cross-sectional analysis, the unemployment variable measured the marginal
effect of varying civilian employment opportunities—controlling for gender and highest
level of education attained—on the probability of retention of military personnel. In time
series analysis, measuring how the relationship between potential alternative employment
and retention differed from one year to the next, would increase the explanatory power of
our model. Without time series analysis, we could not account for the changes in
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unemployment and the economy across time and how military members responded to
those changes.
Most importantly, as we noted earlier, military members incurred lengthy service
obligations after permanent changes-of-station, promotions, and taking advantage of
education benefits. For example, a military member that preferred not to deploy
following the Iraqi invasion in 2003, may have had to wait until 2005 to do so. Our
cross-sectional analysis could not account for this lagged response. This may explain
why we observed the highest R2 value in our officer model for 2007; Air Force officers
were granted waivers to active duty service commitments that immediately allowed them
to voluntarily separate. Largely, military members did not act on immediate response to
variables that affect the decision to stay or go because active duty service commitments
may differ from zero days to five years. Without lagged variables, we cannot optimize at
what point inputs to the model change the binary response from continue in service to
separate for civilian earnings.
Conclusion
The DoD designs compensation to be adequate and fair to support manpower
policies without crowding-out operations, readiness, recapitalization and modernization
of weapon systems. Additionally, compensation must motivate personnel performance
while being responsive to private sector wages and effective during times of peace and
war. Senior decision makers should use our work to support manpower policies that are
put in place. While our research did not explore whether the remaining forces that fill
Air Force ranks are the best mix of personnel, we can conclude cash compensation served
as an effective retention instrument for those members that remained.

68

Appendix A: 2001 Officer Model Results
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/20/08 Time: 23:09
Sample (adjusted): 1 7176
Included observations: 7176 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable
C
VCASH*ZONE1
VCASH*ZONE2
VCASH*ZONE3
VCASH*ZONE4
VMB*ZONE1
VMB*ZONE2
VMB*ZONE3
VMB*ZONE4
UR*ZONE1
UR*ZONE2
UR*ZONE3
UR*ZONE4
McFadden R-squared
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
LR statistic
Prob(LR statistic)

Coefficient Std. Error
2.538729
1.69E-06
-9.88E-07
-4.38E-07
4.86E-07
3.369787
1.566568
1.85337
3.400274
-54.92291
-62.52325
-45.77213
-20.38396
0.055949
0.238389
0.434648
0.447109
0.438936
183.3084
0

Obs with Dep=0
Obs with Dep=1

434
6742
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z-Statistic Prob.
0.293852
4.52E-07
5.61E-07
8.61E-07
2.44E-06
1.884855
1.77226
2.242601
5.11684
13.66228
15.10927
15.40019
30.65498

Mean dependent var
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Restr. log likelihood
Avg. log likelihood

Total obs

8.639497
3.731807
-1.762157
-0.508942
0.199338
1.787823
0.883938
0.826438
0.664526
-4.020039
-4.138072
-2.972179
-0.664948

0
0.0002
0.078
0.6108
0.842
0.0738
0.3767
0.4086
0.5064
0.0001
0
0.003
0.5061
0.939521
0.235982
398.8901
-1546.515
-1638.17
-0.215512

7176

Appendix B: 2004 Officer Model Results
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/20/08 Time: 23:04
Sample: 1 7240
Included observations: 7240
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable
C
VCASH*ZONE1
VCASH*ZONE2
VCASH*ZONE3
VCASH*ZONE4
VMB*ZONE1
VMB*ZONE2
VMB*ZONE3
VMB*ZONE4
UR*ZONE1
UR*ZONE2
UR*ZONE3
UR*ZONE4
McFadden R-squared
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
LR statistic
Prob(LR statistic)

Coefficient Std. Error
1.811846
1.34E-06
2.77E-07
-6.14E-07
-3.21E-06
1.716669
-3.656509
-2.677713
1.622781
-14.88141
1.049714
11.5699
56.87203
0.066791
0.214794
0.365708
0.378075
0.369962
187.6406
0

Obs with Dep=0
Obs with Dep=1

351
6889
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z-Statistic Prob.
0.444334
3.87E-07
5.59E-07
9.06E-07
3.03E-06
1.587014
1.62992
2.207703
5.65046
15.9645
16.79955
17.48456
34.32418

Mean dependent var
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Restr. log likelihood
Avg. log likelihood

Total obs

4.077666
3.456287
0.496032
-0.677525
-1.062194
1.081697
-2.243367
-1.212896
0.287194
-0.932157
0.062485
0.661721
1.656909

0
0.0005
0.6199
0.4981
0.2881
0.2794
0.0249
0.2252
0.774
0.3513
0.9502
0.5082
0.0975
0.951519
0.212494
326.3256
-1310.864
-1404.684
-0.181059

7240

Appendix C: 2007 Officer Model Results
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/20/08 Time: 22:58
Sample: 1 5522
Included observations: 5522
Convergence achieved after 13 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable

Coefficient Std. Error

C
VCASH*ZONE1
VCASH*ZONE2
VCASH*ZONE3
VCASH*ZONE4
VMB*ZONE1
VMB*ZONE2
VMB*ZONE3
VMB*ZONE4
UR*ZONE1
UR*ZONE2
UR*ZONE3
UR*ZONE4

1.259863
-5.08E-07
-1.07E-06
6.78E-07
8.91E-07
3.929971
4.060231
-2.072072
-3.165035
-43.00063
-28.82819
37.45274
65.42751

McFadden R-squared
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
LR statistic
Prob(LR statistic)

0.173752
0.293094
0.523121
0.538698
0.528553
601.992
0

Obs with Dep=0
Obs with Dep=1

524
4998
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z-Statistic Prob.
0.317774
5.68E-07
4.17E-07
8.95E-07
2.46E-06
2.145962
1.211164
2.149751
4.108019
16.2532
15.95184
18.15676
38.41602

Mean dependent var
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Restr. log likelihood
Avg. log likelihood

Total obs

3.964647
-0.894623
-2.566638
0.757936
0.361728
1.831333
3.352338
-0.963866
-0.770453
-2.645671
-1.807201
2.062743
1.703131

0.0001
0.371
0.0103
0.4485
0.7176
0.0671
0.0008
0.3351
0.441
0.0082
0.0707
0.0391
0.0885
0.905107
0.277627
424.6149
-1431.338
-1732.334
-0.259206

5522

Appendix D: 2001 Enlisted Model Results
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/05/08 Time: 08:38
Sample: 1 22768
Included observations: 22768
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable
C
VCASH*ZONE1
VCASH*ZONE2
VCASH*ZONE3
VCASH*ZONE4
VMB*ZONE1
VMB*ZONE2
VMB*ZONE3
VMB*ZONE4
UR*ZONE1
UR*ZONE2
UR*ZONE3
UR*ZONE4
McFadden R-squared
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
LR statistic
Prob(LR statistic)

Coefficient Std. Error
1.852682
-1.39E-07
4.23E-06
3.21E-06
2.85E-06
2.368503
0.887352
0.844218
0.639491
-7.797467
-8.643032
-4.320598
0.321137
0.064877
0.16365
0.236941
0.241528
0.238433
372.4658
0

Obs with Dep=0
Obs with Dep=1

627
22141
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z-Statistic Prob.
0.15401
9.48E-07
7.92E-07
1.05E-06
1.49E-06
0.838682
0.653741
0.838969
1.349963
3.734851
4.100513
5.463046
8.553824

Mean dependent var
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Restr. log likelihood
Avg. log likelihood

Total obs

12.02964
-0.146218
5.337816
3.069622
1.916966
2.824077
1.357345
1.006256
0.47371
-2.087759
-2.107793
-0.790877
0.037543

0
0.8837
0
0.0021
0.0552
0.0047
0.1747
0.3143
0.6357
0.0368
0.035
0.429
0.9701
0.972461
0.162426
600.3236
-2684.341
-2870.574
-0.1179

22768

Appendix E: 2004 Enlisted Model Results
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/05/08 Time: 08:46
Sample: 1 23407
Included observations: 23407
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable
C
VCASH*ZONE1
VCASH*ZONE2
VCASH*ZONE3
VCASH*ZONE4
VMB*ZONE1
VMB*ZONE2
VMB*ZONE3
VMB*ZONE4
UR*ZONE1
UR*ZONE2
UR*ZONE3
UR*ZONE4
McFadden R-squared
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
LR statistic
Prob(LR statistic)

Coefficient Std. Error
1.464282
1.59E-06
2.60E-06
1.52E-06
4.81E-06
1.385772
-0.388268
0.901973
-3.597183
-3.327205
2.325641
7.165595
8.240057
0.076855
0.20615
0.33697
0.341447
0.338424
654.4948
0

Obs with Dep=0
Obs with Dep=1

1041
22366
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z-Statistic Prob.
0.171634 8.531428
6.56E-07
2.42066
7.52E-07 3.460205
1.06E-06 1.437979
1.70E-06 2.822247
0.440456
3.14622
0.518258 -0.74918
0.842658 1.070391
1.2549 -2.86651
3.474156 -0.957702
4.107259 0.566227
5.681269 1.261266
10.71595 0.768952

Mean dependent var
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Restr. log likelihood
Avg. log likelihood

Total obs

0
0.0155
0.0005
0.1504
0.0048
0.0017
0.4537
0.2844
0.0042
0.3382
0.5712
0.2072
0.4419
0.955526
0.203745
971.1282
-3930.733
-4257.981
-0.16793

23407

Appendix F: 2007 Enlisted Model Results
Dependent Variable: CONTINUE
Method: ML - Binary Probit (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 04/20/08 Time: 13:00
Sample: 1 17667
Included observations: 17667
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives
Variable
C
VCASH*ZONE1
VCASH*ZONE2
VCASH*ZONE3
VCASH*ZONE4
VMB*ZONE1
VMB*ZONE2
VMB*ZONE3
VMB*ZONE4
UR*ZONE1
UR*ZONE2
UR*ZONE3
UR*ZONE4
McFadden R-squared
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
LR statistic
Prob(LR statistic)

Coefficient Std. Error
1.748679
3.89E-06
3.26E-06
2.31E-06
3.09E-06
1.600923
1.119744
0.480192
-0.218497
-17.33753
-15.08669
-4.578489
-8.224954
0.075733
0.235912
0.416693
0.422417
0.418577
601.0752
0

Obs with Dep=0
Obs with Dep=1

1045
16622
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z-Statistic Prob.
0.127066
9.58E-07
5.35E-07
8.49E-07
1.20E-06
0.631422
0.400846
0.691202
1.138853
3.408329
3.517878
5.189391
9.201136

Mean dependent var
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Restr. log likelihood
Avg. log likelihood

Total obs

13.76195
4.065983
6.083885
2.723307
2.581175
2.535423
2.793454
0.69472
-0.191857
-5.086812
-4.288576
-0.882279
-0.893906

0
0
0
0.0065
0.0098
0.0112
0.0052
0.4872
0.8479
0
0
0.3776
0.3714
0.94085
0.232321
952.8412
-3667.856
-3968.393
-0.207611

17667
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